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Introduction
Opposition movements to big development projects have grown
significantly in France since the early 1980s.1 It was the south-eastern
TGV plan that started things going; protest against new infrastructures became
more and more systematic, whether for transportation
infrastructures (TGV, airports, extra high voltage (EHV) lines) or
polluting facilities (waste incinerators, nuclear waste, landfills/dumping sites,
etc.).
The rise in protest aiming systematically to challenge the legitimacy
of projects was formed and developed locally through the mobilization
of local actors directly interested in the defense of their environment.
Planners, soon followed by researchers, referred to these fights as
NIMBY, the invention of this acronym standing in for true analysis. The
real danger for political science to have taken over this dismissive expression
will be brought up later. For now, suffice it to say that it has worked as a
smokescreen, something preventing the consideration of these fights
fanning out from the local level but which tend, well beyond, to lead to a
lasting and deep redefinition of the balance of powers among the various
levels of the State (administrations and elected officials), planners, and the
civil society; it is thus impossible to see these local battles as merely a local
affair.
One hypothesis here is that focusing the analysis on local fights makes
it possible to question the tools and conclusions that the sociology of
social movements now has at its disposal. Likewise, the analysis of local
public policies and the sociology of local party circles has been, more
generally, very instructive on the way in which public policies (Mabileau,
1993) and the sociology of political parties (Sawicki, 1997) have been
implemented.
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This paper stresses the study of local mobilization to show first how
development conflicts have produced a definite change in the forms of public
debate and the ways public policies have been implemented. In other words,
not only does the State, through the systems of structuring society it defines,
contribute to defining a field of possibilities for movements (McCarthy et al.,
1991), but the movements themselves can spark a change in the political rules
of the game. From that point of view, the field of environmental movements
represents one of the best vantage points for anyone interested in the outcomes
of social movements (Giugni et al. (1999) on outcomes; Della Porta and Rucht
(2002) on environmental campaigns).
Secondly, it is worth taking a fresh look at certain ‘commonplace notions’ in
the sociology of social movements through the prism of local conflicts. First of
all, the classic definition of contentious politics — which in the literature is
based on a distinction between insiders and outsiders, challengers and elites,
civil societies and the State — is contradicted here by the complexity of the
interdependences at work — how the fields of alliances and conflict are locally
constructed. More generally, in the same spirit as the work on the policing of
protest (Fillieule, 1997; Della Porta and Reiter, 1998), it is the very definition
of the State, in its substantialist version, that is challenged. Secondly, the
observation that in environmental conflicts there is a deep change in protest
action repertoires put back on the agenda of disciplinary debates the question
of the reception of information, in particular through the protest event analysis
method, which is most often based on the identification of modes of action that
have largely been either replaced or at least supplemented by an ‘expert’
repertoire of action to which the press pays no attention (Fillieule and Jimenez,
forthcoming).
Finally, and in conclusion, the analysis of planning conflicts at the local level
is a plea to enrich the research tools by taking into account recent analytical
work on public policies, with, in particular, the conceptual tools of policy
networks and advocacy coalitions.
This paper deals with the conflict that unfolded in the Hautes Pyre´ne´es from
1984 to 1996, the project for an EHV line between France and Spain that was
to go through the Louron Valley. After briefly relating the conflict itself
emphasis will be placed on the cognitive dimension of the mobilization by
analyzing first the way in which the mobilized groups tried to define a
framework of interpretation of the affair so as to guarantee mobilization, and
second, the specific constraints that single-issue fights run into. In this type of
conflict, the definition of multi-organizational fields is made more complex
vertically by the intermingling of local and national actors, and horizontally by
the political-administrative sphere and the civil society, and also by the
redefinition of the State’s methods of opposition management, under the very
effect of mobilization.
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The Louron Case
The birth of a development project
The present interconnection grid between France and Spain consists of five
trans-Pyrenean lines. Two of them are EHV lines. Since 1976, EDF has been
studying the possibility of increasing the export of its electric energy to Spain.
The construction of a sixth trans-Pyrenean line was part of the scheduled
increase in transmission capacity in the region to be achieved by putting the
Golfech (Tarn-et-Garonne) nuclear plant into service. EDF presented the
planned 400 kV2 circuit EHV line joining Cazaril-Tamboure`s on 20 January
1984. The line crossed the Neste, Nistos and Louron valleys on the French side
and the Taberes and Gistain valleys in Spain. It was to be 273 km long with
60 km on the French side and 185 km on the Spanish side. For EDF the project
was the contract of the century, as the sale of electricity to Spain and Portugal
was expected to bring in close to 2 billion francs a year.
The decision to build the line was ratified in July 1984 by a ministerial
committee that chose the Louron route after a quick look at other routes even
though the Minister of the Environment at the time, Huguette Bouchardeau,
opposed it and a previous ministerial committee had adopted the principle of
putting the Louron valley on the historical register.2 From that moment on,
EDF had a clear path, and in the summer 1984, technicians were sent there to
prepare the ground.3 However, there was immediate resistance, paving the way
for the Louron Valley EHV-line saga to begin. It ended 12 years later, in
December 1996, with the project being shelved.
Act One: September 1984–April 1989
Regional governments set the opposition to this development project in
motion. The Midi-Pyre´ne´es DRAE, backed by the Secretary of State for
Environment, persisted in attempting to register the Louron Valley — a
process begun in 1982 — thus hoping to derail the project.
At the same time, once the process was launched, the DRAE would point
out the many irregularities and omissions of the impact study (April 1985).
Even before the definitive choice of the line, the DRAE had suggested another
one, through the Aran valley, endorsed by the National Office of Forests
(ONF). The project was not accepted, however, for at least three reasons: the
King of Spain indicated that he was against this route because it was too near
the Baqueira-Beiret ski resort he patronized. The route would necessitate
lengthening the Spanish side of the line, an additional cost France refused to
pay for. Lastly and above all, this route went through Catalonia, and the
Spanish government feared a mobilization of autonomists. The Aragonese
solution turned out to be the least risky.
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The civil society reacted through its local elected officials who attempted to
impose a different line. A multi-party defense committee was set up in August
1984, composed of mayors, general councilors, two deputies and the Senator
and Mayor of Lourdes. The committee also included Michel Geoffre, regional
councilor and president of Bigorre Ecology, and trade union delegates from the
FNSEA and CDJA, two farmers’ unions, as the farmers were showing signs of
worry. The first move of this committee was to complain to the Regional
Council and to write to the prefect asking him to have the State re-examine the
proposed route. A different solution was defended.
At this stage, the mobilization was essentially institutional, with a few
regional administrations on one side and, on the other, elected department
officials who immediately complained about not being consulted either by
EDF or by the government. At the same time, on the Spanish side, the same
type of mobilization of local elected officials gathered steam around the plan to
create a national park.
Ten months later, in June 1985, whereas neither EDF nor the government
had in any way broached the subject, environmental protection associations
took up the issue; or rather, because the volunteer leaders were largely the same
locally elected officials already mobilized, it was within the framework of
volunteer organization mobilization that the mayors and regional councilors
would organize. The strategy adopted was two-fold: First, thanks to the work
of experts, the environmentalists put themselves on EDF’s terrain by
suggesting alternative solutions that were less harmful for the environment;
secondly, by counting on the mobilization in progress on the Spanish side, they
made a show of strength by organizing demonstrations and securing media
coverage.
First, the involvement of experts. In June 1985, the COPRAE (Permanent
Regional Council of Environmental Associations, Midi-Pyre´ne´es) published a
report that put forward two alternative solutions (the reinforcement of existing
lines and the proposed route of the Aran valley). At a press conference on 7
April 1987, UMINATE presented a new line plan through the Boucharo pass,
near the Gavarnie.cirque. Not only did the proposal provide all the guarantees
of reliability and expertise, but also Michel Geoffre, the president of
UMINATE, announced that the local officials of the Valley of the Luz,
Gavarnie, approved the line as did the DDE and there would be no opposition
of the western National Pyre´ne´es park board (Gavarnie).
Resorting to a show of strength, secondly. The first demonstration, called by
the COPRAE and the ecologists on 16 July 1985, gathered few people. It was in
Arreau, on the path of the Tour de France. This was when contacts between
French and Spanish associations were made, leading to an annual Franco-
Spanish demonstration. The first one took place on 19 August 1985 in Ge´nos,
in the Louron and gathered at most 500 people, most of whom came from
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Spain. On 23 August 1986, the second demonstration took place at the entry to
the Aragnouet tunnel: there were 200 people, mostly Spanish again. On the
French side, the few dozen demonstrators were local officials and members of
volunteer associations. However, for the first time, SEPANSO, the regional
federation of environmental associations, was present, showing that general
mobilization was gaining. Then on 13 August 1988, the demonstration took
place at Loudenvielle with 30 French people and 200 Spanish. A ‘no pasaran!’
sign was put up before a 3-h march ending in a press conference.
On 26 August 1988, the minister of industry, Roger Fauroux, declared that
the EHV line was of public interest. The way seemed clear for the construction
permit to be signed and the work to begin. However, after a trip to the valley of
the Louron, the minister postponed the decision on 12 April 1989. The Greens’
intense lobbying and especially the unanimous mobilization of all the elected
officials made him back down. He himself was from Tarbes and mayor of
Saint-Girons. In fact, the project was not abandoned; EDF was simply asked
to make new studies of the proposed lines. The decision to back down was
probably because of EDF’s stubborn refusal to discuss or negotiate alternative
solutions.
Finally, on 15 December 1989, the minister reinstated the public interest
declaration. EDF came up with a study in which the Gavarnie solution was
declared invalid and proposed instead, in exchange for the EHV in the Louron,
to bury the part of the 220 kV that passed through the Gavarnie park. At the
same time as his decision, the minister also announced a study mission to the
National Assembly on the best way to provide electricity in their environment
and the necessary improvement of administrative procedures to guarantee
dialogue. Associations and local officials were to be included in this mission.
Act Two: December 1989–November 1991
The battle seemed to be lost when the environment minister, Brice Lalonde
(Ge´ne´ration Ecologie), joined in the fray and said, on 22 December 1989, that
there would be a study on registering the Valley of the Pez as protected land.
This study automatically delayed the beginning of the work for 1 year. The
decision directly contradicted the industry minister’s decision and angered
Matignon, the Prime Minister’s office. Brice Lalonde was asked to withdraw
his procedure. He refused and called for arbitration at the highest level. On 16
March 1990, the departmental commission of sites gave its agreement to
registering the upper valley. However, on 29 March, the case was stopped by
Matignon. On 30 May Brice Lalonde gave in and agreed to the EHV line. The
construction permit was granted by the Hautes-Pyre´ne´es prefect on 13 June
and on 4 July, the minister approved the project and gave the green light for
work to begin.
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While the environment ministry was seeking ways to block the work, the
mobilization of the associations and the officials continued. The associations’
strategy shifted to the legal sphere. A Paris law firm specialized in environment
questions was brought in. Huglo-Lepage had defended the victims of the
Amoco-Cadiz oil spill. The battle would focus on the substance of the project
and on legal irregularities so as to delay the beginning of the work. In January
1990, the collective to save the Pyre´ne´es (CSP) referred the industry minister’s
decision authorizing the work to the Conseil d’Etat for abuse of power. In
addition, on 9 August 1990 the Huglo-Lepage firm filed a suit in the
administrative court of Pau against the prefectoral decision of 13 June, in
which the prefect of the Hautes-Pyre´ne´es had granted the construction permit.
Entering the legal battle did not preclude traditional forms of mobilization,
and the annual demonstration of 29 August 1990 at the Ge´nos lake gathered 22
French and nine Spanish associations, with participation of several hundred
people, mostly Spanish. That was also the day the Greens demonstrated in
Lourdes, reported in Le Monde on 31 August 1990.4
Mobilization of the officials was intensifying mainly through the unanimous
commitment of the Midi-Pyre´ne´es regional council with the Hautes-Pyre´ne´es
general council and mayors. The general council of the Hautes-Pyre´ne´es
ordered a feasibility study from Omnitech, an independent Palois firm, for an
EHV line with underground direct current cable (costing more than 120,000
FF); it also suggested to the government that it begin talks with EDF, the
representatives of the Hautes-Pyre´ne´es, the region, the Aragon and Catalan
officials. On 16 October 1991, a motion was passed to demand the end of the
project. Increasing mobilization among elected officials could also be measured
by the participation of people like Dominique Baudis, Toulouse’s deputy
mayor, who in April 1991 put a written question to Michel Rocard, Prime
Minister, about the EHV line; Antoine Waechter, the Greens’ spokesman,
demanded the Brice Lalonde’s resignation because ‘by remaining in the
government, you’ve been the accomplice of the massacre of two splendid
valleys as well as of disastrous energy and road choices for the country’ (16
September 1991). Lastly, Marc Censi, UDF representative, requested a
meeting with the minister of industry along with UMINATE.
Confronted with the mobilization of the region’s representatives from all
sides, the answer of the new minister of industry (Dominique Strauss Khan)
was first to demand a new examination of the case, pretexting the need to ‘go
around once more before starting the work’ (10 July 1990). Not that an
alternative solution was being envisaged, but this was simply a way to make up
for the lack of dialogue and consultation. In fact, early September 1991, the
minister authorized the project. However, the associations made the claim that
the DUP and the construction permit were awaiting a court decision from the
Conseil d’Etat and the court of Pau and that it was out of the question to begin
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work before these decisions were handed down. Franc¸ois Mitterrand’s
intervention supporting the suspension was decisive. Nothing happened until
5 November 1991 when Pau’s administrative court pronounced the indefinite
postponement of the construction permit. The associations shouted victory.
EDF announced an appeal before the Conseil d’Etat that now had to judge the
whole case: EDF’s appeal, the validity of the construction permit and the
declaration of public utility. Brice Lalonde flew over the valley of the Louron
by helicopter and declared to the journalists that ‘it was very beautiful and
shouldn’t be touched.’
Act Three: January 1993–December 1996
As of 1993, the situation had changed considerably in that the government was
more and more wary of the project. There was the rising mobilization for the
tunnel of Somport, and Balladur, the prime minister, wanted to avoid another
front at all costs. Moreover, a national debate on energy was to take place, and
Michel Barnier, minister of the environment, stated that regardless of the
Conseil d’Etat’s decision, the results of this debate had to be taken into account
before beginning the work (June 1993). Thus, after the Conseil upheld EDF
and ratified the DUP (29 April 1994), Matignon also said it was necessary to
wait for the national debate (May 1994). However, when it occurred, in
December 1994, the Souviron report came out in favor of the project, albeit
denouncing EDF’s lack of transparency and the democratic deficit that
pervaded the whole affair.
While the government was stepping back, the associations and local groups
continued to wage war on the legal front. In January 1993, the CLEMP (Midi-
Pyre´ne´es coordination of electric lines), a regional federation of associations,
was created that aimed to combat several proposed lines, basing itself on the
‘lines’ protocol signed between the government and EDF on 25 August 1992,
stipulating that wherever new routes were envisaged, dialogues and an
examination of alternative routes be put in place as well.
As far as the territorial groups (general and regional councils) and
UMINATE were concerned, in June 1994 they undertook a new move at the
Pau administrative court to annul the construction permit and filed an appeal
before the European Commission in Brussels on the basis of article 169 and
before the European Court of Justice for non-respect of community law in
administrative investigation of trans-frontier projects. On 6 January 1995, the
Pau court canceled the permit. EDF appealed the decision before the Bordeaux
administrative court. The case was judged on 14 December 1995 and EDF
won.
The legal battle was lost. One last demonstration was organized for one last
attempt at pressure. On 26 January 1996, 200 people demonstrated against the
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Minister of the Environment, Corinne Lepage, at the closing of the regional
Environment and Sustainable Development conference that was held in
Tarbes. At the same time, the associations and elected officials, represented by
Michel Pelieu, (general councilor, Hautes-Pyre´ne´es) publicly requested
arbitration at the highest level. Michel Pelieu addressed an open letter to
Alain Juppe´ (Prime Minister and mayor of Bordeaux), Corinne Lepage,
Philippe Douste-Blazy (Culture Minister) and Borotra (Industry Minister) in
which he recalled that there was an ongoing suit in Brussels as well as an appeal
following the Bordeaux administrative appeals court decision. Since none of
these actions suspended the project, he asked the government to freeze the
plan. On 25 January, Alain Juppe´ met with Michel Pelieu for 15 min, in the
presence of Philippe Douste-Blazy, mayor of Lourdes and minister of culture.
On 1 February 1996, Alain Juppe´, visibly moved, declared to the National
Assembly during question time that he was definitively burying the EHV line
question: ‘I am shocked when I see these unique landscapes desecrated by the
EHV lines, carried by very high pylons, irrevocably harming the environment.’
On 6 February, he made a flash visit to Louron: Enthusiastically, he said to the
press: ‘I’ve chosen the environment, democracy and the development of the
territory. We must change our way of governing because we can no longer take
decisions that the people are against. Here, you are carrying out a policy of
development and protection of the symbolic sites for a better territorial
balance, and the government will help within the framework of support of
rural development.’ On 7 February, he proposed registering the Louron Valley
as national heritage, effective on 18 December 1996. The valley was saved.
EDF had to find alternative solutions to fulfill its contract signed with Spain.
Grievance extension, cultural resources and action repertoires
The literature on land development conflicts has been a key factor in
introducing the cultural and cognitive dimension into the classic perspective of
resource mobilization via the attention given to how organized groups redefine
the very terms of the fight. Two issues have been studied extensively: one
concerning the sociology of social problems (Gusfield, 1986), the way in which
environmental groups have endeavored to construct reference frameworks as
alternatives to the dominant one of technological progress and economic
development in order to defend the idea of sustainable development and
respect for the planet’s natural landscape and resources. As Fabiani
emphasized, ‘there is no consensus around nature; the conflict on contradictory
social uses of natural space is a given and the notion of the protection of nature
is a stake in the fight among social groups’ (1986). The literature on this subject
has highlighted the crucial role of grievances and their rhetorical use in the
formation, activities and chances of success of protest groups.5
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The other issue has to do with the particular constraints that territorialized
fights have come up against, in other words single-issue, geographically
localized battles (Gordon and Jasper, 1996). How do protest groups manage to
globalize their rhetoric to mobilize outsider groups and public opinion through
the media, and to justify their fight in the name of the same general interest that
the authorities claim and that the groups are opposed to? This constraint of
frame extension refers to the labeling of development conflicts in terms of
NIMBY as an attempt at disqualification. The expression was coined by
American planners who had a vested interest in delegitimizing the protests of
their development projects. To refer again to Pierre Lascoumes, ‘it is important
to see that when an association is criticized for being merely a manifestation of
the NIMBY syndrome, it is usually made by the companies or administrations
doing the developing, trying to disqualify these groupings of ‘marginals’
against technological progress and looking out for more cooperative
interlocutors’ (1994, 233). The thrust of the term NIMBY is to produce a
dichotomy between the rights of citizens (thought to be of the same mind as the
general interest through the choice of their representatives) and those of the
inhabitants, necessarily invested with individual and selfish interests.6 Here,
following the helpful suggestion of Jobert (1998), the term ‘development
conflicts’ will be used.
The Louron Valley case provides a typical and ideal illustration of the way in
which protest groups attempt to raise the stakes of their cause to counteract the
delegitimation of them in the name of the general interest and to gather around
them, collective actors and individuals who are not directly concerned.
In the first phase of the conflict (1984–1989), the main argument stressed the
exceptional value of the landscape and heritage of the Louron Valley.7 As of
1984, the DRAE established the terms of this argument by not only defending
the idea that the valley represented an original preserved entity through its
relative isolation in geographical and landscape terms, but also because of the
preservation of the built environment. The Louron Valley was presented as the
archetype of the 19th century Pyrenean valley. The strength of this line of
argumentation lay in its being labeled from the beginning as the ‘conflict of
Louron,’ even though the proposed line also went through the Neste and the
Nistos valleys. The Nistos valley is a ‘territory without qualities,’ in Bernard
Kalaora’s words (1981). In the eyes of the Pyrenean specialists who were
helping to create the image, it was devoid of worthwhile features. In the press,
though, this valley was presented not only as a ‘green and mossy gem’ (Le
Monde, 20/08/85) but also as the ‘cousin’ of the Louron valley, the one that did
have a geographical and cultural entity. This rhetoric of landscape and cultural
heritage defined by DRAE dismisses the NIMBY reference by invoking a
universal common good, basing it on the 1982 proposal to register the site of
the valley. At the same time, the rhetoric of the common good entitled
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opponents to make suggestions typically qualified as NIMBY by public
authorities and the media, that is, shifting the proposed routes to other places.
This operation was facilitated in that the first route through the Aran Valley,
less harmful ecologically, was agreed upon until the King of Spain decided
against it for his own personal interest. The protesters would have had an easy
time turning the accusation of playing into the hands of special interests
against the government and EDF. The local officials would adopt the rhetoric
of the common good but link it to an economic rhetoric: the preservation of
Louron’s cultural heritage would also serve their interests since the valley
represented a unique worldwide tourist mine. However if tourism was to help
fight the exodus from the valleys and lead to lasting job creation, the EHV line
would jeopardize all of those efforts. Through this frame extension, the elected
officials were both defenders of the landscape and inhabitants of the valleys
while claiming to be more realistic than the ecologists who were stigmatized as
unrealistic dreamers.8 The use of economic rhetoric is also helpful in
questioning the substance of the project. The officials and soon the associations
pointed out that if it was deemed necessary to sell current to Spain (that would
be sold at a loss), it meant that the construction of the Golfech nuclear plant in
1982 was actually unnecessary and that the aim was really to sell off the
resulting overproduction. The infernal logic in which energy planning mistakes
had to be paid for twice was denounced.
Lastly, a third field on which the mobilization was played out in this first
period was that of participation rhetoric. Local officials felt betrayed by the
government and EDF because they were never consulted on the project. They
denounced the absence of transparency of the procedures and the scorn of
‘national representatives.’ A turning point in the protesters’ strategy was
reached in 1988 in that procedural rhetoric was becoming central and was used
increasingly (Gordon and Jasper, 1996). Thus, the fight was shifting to the legal
field, the stakes being to delay the start of the work as long as possible once the
environment ministry failed to get the site registered.
Three new points were added to the argumentation:
(1) On the one hand, the mention of European directive 85/337 on
environmental protection and electrical energy transportation projects that
were not taken into account by the developers; on the other hand, the
complaint filed at the Conseil d’Etat by the CSP in January 1990 against the
industry ministry’s decision authorizing the work and against the prefectoral
decision delivering the construction permit (August 1990).
(2) Then the UMINATE association sought in the cadastral archives as a
way to disqualify the redefinition of the zoning plan. Thus, during the summer
of 1990, UMINATE unearthed three cases to try to invalidate the construction
permit: the illegal building of the cross-country ski resort Nistos–Cap–Neste`s,
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bringing to the fore an old problem having to do with a 7 km2 piece of land
that was to have received several pylons. Even more, it was EDF that partially
financed the construction of the resort to get in the good graces of the towns
involved. In a press release in August 1988, the group of associations accused
EDF of carrying out ‘an aggressive development policy for the natural
surroundings by buying, if necessary, the agreement of individuals or local
governing bodies concerned by its projectsy The Nistos cross-country ski
stadium is the obvious example of this influence and money peddling. It was
built on a virgin site, already one of contention between Nistos and
Sarrancolin, with no administrative authorization, no construction permit,
largely financed by EDF, with the support of the prefectoral services that we
had alerted several times to get them to intervene.’
(3) Lastly, the fact that the access route to the ski resort and the route of the
line would cross the Nistos protected forest, registered by a presidential decree
of 22 March 1927. These affairs were in administrative appeal. Josette Durieu,
the general counselor of the canton of the Neste valley, was violently attacked
by the associations because she negotiated directly and secretly with EDF to
finance the resort and various other facilities in exchange for the passage of the
line. The use of procedural rhetoric is enhanced by the denunciation of
collusion among special interests under the cover of general interest.
The government reacted to this outburst of legal cases by trying to answer
the participationist rhetoric while defending the economic and technical
opportunities of the project. On 14 June 1994, for example, the Hautes-
Pyre´ne´es prefect visited Louron and announced ‘a national debate on energy
and environment that will deal with the issues of national political development
of electricity and the impact of electric lines. Everyone will be able to express
his observations on these issues.’ During this debate a few months later in
December 1994, while defending the possibilities of the project, the Souviron
report noted a ‘general feeling of a democratic deficit in the establishment and
implementation of energy decisionsy. Transparency demands that any
decision in infrastructure needs must be preceded by an independent
expertisey. These principles have to be applied with special attention in the
case of trans-frontier electric lines. The project of the EHV line is exemplary:
more dialogue would certainly have prevented the present blocked situation’.
The strategy was obviously to divide the front of the opponents by winning the
favors of the elected locals, finally recognized as legitimate representatives of
local public opinion. Too late, this strategy failed and the legal battle would
gather steam; the CEE (as of June 1994) called for an extension of the conflict
until the final victory in February 1996.
On the whole, looking at the Louron Valley affair suggests four types of
argumentation the protesters have at their disposal to publicize their cause and
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which were implemented in the major development conflicts in the last 20
years: conflicts concerning the TGV (Lolive, 1999; Blatrix, 2000), the EHV
lines (Remy, 1995; Leborgne, 1999) and more generally (Catherin, 2000; Larue,
2000). Table 1 summarizes them.
Local rhetoric is based on the defense of a site in the name of quality of life
for the inhabitants and feared or expected environmental problems. Neither
the project itself nor the technical choices accompanying it are called into
question. The problem lies solely in the choice of location, rejected by the
inhabitants. The only alternative rhetoric in this case is a change in the planned
line.
The common good rhetoric functions according to the same territorial
principle as local rhetoric, but it raises the stakes by elevating the site
concerned as a cultural, registered, heritage. This case also must be solved by
alternative planned lines.
Global rhetoric refers to two generally linked aspects: scientific–technical
protest and economic protest. The first one tries to challenge the worth of a
development project that is harmful in all cases. In the case of the EHV lines,
there are public health risks (leukemia, accidents), the need to make
underground installations, etc. The second one implies advocating either to
give up the project or to adopt alternative technical solutions.
Procedural rhetoric resides in the denunciation of law breaking and the
collusion between the government and sector-based or private interests.
Gordon and Jasper defined it as: ‘procedural rhetoric refers to the validity of
decision-making procedures rather than the direct merits of the target. y
Local protestors y often develop a rhetoric that concentrates on abuse of
power, lack of official accountability, or cozy relations between business and
the state.’ Spector and Kitsuse (1987, 151) say: ‘As a consequence, assertions
about the inadequacy, inefficacy, or injustice of the procedures may themselves
become the conditions around which new social problems activities are
organized’ (Gordon and Jasper, 1996, 163). In the Louron affair, the
denunciation of EDF as a state within a state considering itself above the
law and endeavoring to corrupt both elected officials and individuals by buying
their agreement falls within this rhetoric.
Lastly, participation rhetoric has to do with the denunciation of a lack of
democracy, the obvious scorn for local officials, legitimate representatives of
the citizens, and the lack of direct citizen input. This aspect will be dealt with
again in the last part of this text concerning the change in the paradigm in
public policies in France under the effect of development conflicts.
Table 1 suggests a link of dependence between types of justification and ways
of action. It is true that rhetoric and action strategies are highly
interdependent. Much literature has shown the extent to which grievances
play a role in the definition of the activities of protest groups (e.g. Walsh, 1981;
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Gamson, 1992; Jasper, 1997). This also means that the different justification
types can only be mobilized under certain resource conditions. The Louron
affair is exemplary from this point of view as well. Table 1 shows that each
form of rhetoric corresponds to a specific type of action. The common
denominator of these modes of action, apart from street demonstrations that
never played any role at all in this affair, is that they all necessitate more or less
expensive forms of expertise, which poses the problem, mentioned elsewhere, of
Table 1 Types of justifications for opposing a zoning plan
Proposals Preferred action
Local rhetoric
Defense of the site in the
name of inhabitants’ quality
of life. Fighting against
disagreeable things
Alternative routes
Other places
Direct action (demonstrations/
blockades) Technical expertise
on the routes, the places of
installation
Common good rhetoric
Elevate sites to the rank of
landscape/cultural heritage
The site as universal cultural
good.
Alternative routes
Other places
Aesthetic–scientific expertise
Cultural heritage/museification
(procedure of registering the
sites as cultural heritage)
Global rhetoric
Technical–scientific protest against
the justification for harmful
planning in all cases
Economic protest of the interest
of the project: cost of
construction/profitability
Project abandoned
Alternative solutions
(improvement of existing/
other energies/techniques)
Technical–scientific expertise
Feasibility studies
Economic forecasts
Procedural rhetoric
Illegalities. Protest of the validity
of the decision-making procedures,
abuse of power
Collusion between the State
and private interests
Transparency of
procedures
Cancellation of abusive
decisions
Ensuring legality
Legal expertise
Recourse before civil and ad-
ministrative courts
Recourse before the EEC
Participationist rhetoric
Democratic deficit in the decision
No dialogue
With the citizens
With the local officials
With the administrations involved
Public debate; local/
national
Meeting with elected
representatives
Discussion of real
alternatives
Appeal to public opinion/media
coverage
Recourse to people power: de-
monstrations
Symbolic /media attracting op-
erations
Debates/meetings/local referen-
dum
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the ‘expertification’ of environmental activism and the way in which ‘financial
resources are used to promulgate ideologies and injustice frames, and how
cultural meanings and rhetoric shape the definition and accumulation of
financial resources’ (Gordon and Jasper, 1996, 161).
The studies on alternative lines (here the two Aran Valley projects and then
through the Boucharo/Gavarnie pass), the scientific justification of registering
the site as cultural heritage (given the presence of plant and animal life to
protect, for instance), feasibility studies for alternative procedures (under-
ground lines, underwater cables, reinforcement of existing high voltage lines,
etc.), economic forecasts aimed to contradict those put forward by the
developer, the possibility of filing suits on the administrative, civil and
European levels, all this requires considerable resources, both financial (here
the local bodies paid for the studies, the hiring of a law firm) and human. One
of the striking aspects of development conflicts is how protest associations
solicit and use skills and competence people have acquired elsewhere in the
professional field: retirees who have had high-level positions, engineers,
university professors, etc.
More than in other areas, in this type of locally situated conflict, the
effectiveness of the protest depends on the ability to publicize the cause. As Jobert
has stated: ‘constituting audiences for zoning cases goes hand in hand with media
coverage of these questions; even though they are usually limited to local media,
and are even relegated to local editions of the regional press, they introduce
zoning into political communication. In the context of the fight for access to
media coverage in which David is pitted against Goliath, most of the exorbitant
means at the disposal of the public authorities turn out to be highly limited, even
if its legal resources remain intact’ (1998, 77). Added to this is the fact that the
participationist rhetoric does not stand a chance of being effective without an
audience that contests the limited deliberations among decision-makers.
It is therefore important to mention that in the early years of the conflict the
local media (La De´peˆche du Midi and La Nouvelle Re´publique) gave first billing
to EDF’s and the prefectoral administration’s arguments, but they soon and
unambiguously turned to support the protesters. In the first period, for
example, EDF press releases and information meetings were reported without
any critical objectivity. Then, as of 1989, the situation changed and the press
published in full the associations’ press releases while systematically
emphasizing the sound grounds of the fight. It is known that the data
available on local media and environmental conflicts suggest that environ-
mental groups tend to enjoy qualitatively greater local media access, at least for
certain issues (Moloch and Lester, 1975; Freidman et al., 1987; Sandman et al.,
1987; Spears et al., 1987; Singh et al., 1989; Cottle, 1993; Anderson, 1997;
Fillieule and Jimenez, forthcoming). Beyond this rule, the deep reason for the
local press’s rallying to the cause was that the population (and thus the
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potential clientele) was totally behind the cause, as were the elected officials as
a whole, with whom, obviously, the links of interdependence were evidently
very tight. For example, the conflict was very different in the Somport case.
There the people mobilized were considered as ‘foreigners’ or ‘imposters’ and
local press support was no longer obvious.
On the national level, lastly, it is also significant that Marc Ambroise Rendu,
Le Monde’s journalist specialized in the environment (see Fillieule and Ferrier,
1999), made his support of the protesters’ naturalist arguments very clear in
the few articles that he wrote on the conflict. Likewise, the local AFP
correspondent was neutral at first but soon joined the protesters’ camp. As of
the 29 August 1990 demonstration, mention of the technical aspects of the
project (EDF speech) was superceded by a systematic reminder of the project’s
harmful environmental consequences:
‘The villages of the valley where hay is still cut by hand but where a discrete
form of tourism suitable for the environment has developed have been
organized against this line for a long time. The line is supposed to run along
the side of the mountain and, with its 60 to 80-meter pylon, will mar the
exceptional landscape whose registry as cultural heritage is now suspended’
(AFP, 8/25/1990).
Partiality reached a height in a 6 January 1995 250-word report that was
supposed to cover EDF’s appeal of the administrative court’s decision. After a
brief summary of the facts, the report stressed the ‘enormity,’ and thus the
illegitimacy of the project: ‘the project calls for the use of 8 cm cables help up
by 90 140-ton pylons measuring at most 61 m high.’
The State in Pieces: Advocacy Coalitions, Changing Paradigms and the
Transformation of Public Policies
The Louron affair provides a paradigmatic example of the way in which
development conflicts contribute to challenging common perceptions of
French polity, but more generally also of the investigative value of concepts
and traditional ways of doing the sociology of social movements. The
development conflicts of the last 15 years question the common but unrealistic
distinction between State and protest organizations, and particularly in the
case of France, frequently viewed solely as an all-powerful central State in
opposition to civil society. Since the mid-1980s and the effective implementa-
tion of decentralization legislation, because of the effective transfer of a certain
number of central State prerogatives to local authorities and, finally, of the
increasing withdrawal of the welfare state, it is no longer possible to present
things so simplistically. Beyond the case of France, moreover, the conflict
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analyzed here illustrates the extent to which traditional conceptual tools are
increasingly inadequate to deal with a number of transformations that have in
recent years affected the relation between State and society. As Kennis and
Schneider (1991) point out, ‘the growth in number of ‘‘organized local
authorities,’’ the growth in number of political actors implicated in the process
of public policies, the intensification of sectoralization and differentiation of
policies and administrations, the proliferation of forms of ‘‘private govern-
ment,’’ the ‘‘transnationalization’’ of national policy — all these contribute to a
profound change in the way in which we can think through the issue of
collective action and contestation’ (Fillieule and Ferrier, 2000). See also
Fillieule (1997) and Fillieule and Ferrier (1999).
After briefly reviewing the nature of the coalitions that led to the
constitution of the multi-organizational field of the opponents to the line,
which leads more generally to questioning the classic split between insiders and
outsiders, challengers and the State, we will show how, influenced by the
development of protest to big projects, the public development policies have
changed, contributing to a lasting modification of political opportunities for
environmental movements (see Chart 1).
In the Louron affair, first certain components of the administration got
organized, followed by the local officials and then by the environmental
associations, either pre-existing or created for the occasion. This situation is
one of the common characteristics of all development conflicts in the last 15
years. There is an astonishing blurring of frontiers with conflicts that join at
several levels and transversally at the State/civil society cleavage: conflicts
between the ministry of the environment and the ministry of industry; conflicts
between the central government and regions, departments and towns through
the mobilization of regional, general and municipal councils; conflicts among
administrations, whether deconcentrated or decentralized, which replicate the
first two conflict axes. There are three observations that can be made: (1) There
is great heterogeneity of the actors in the fields of alliance and conflict: elected
officials, associations, administrations and public and private companies alike
can find themselves united. In most cases, the coalitions formed around locally
situated conflicts generally tend to network around the ministry of environ-
ment, officials and associations. (2) The coalitions thus formed transcend
partisan cleavages. In the Louron affair, it is worth noting that the Midi-
Pyre´ne´es Regional Council and the Hautes-Pyre´ne´es General Council, as well
as the mayors of the valleys, were unanimous in their protest against the EHV
line. (3) Lastly, the heterogeneity of the actors must be balanced by the
existence of complex forms of multipositionality. The officials are simple
members or leaders of environmental associations and sometimes inhabitants
whose personal interests are directly affected by the development projects.
Industry ministry civil servants are generally alumni of the same institutes as
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decision-makers at EDF or SNCF (Ecoles des Mines and of the Ponts et
chausse´es).
In fact, it is the cognitive approaches to public policy that provide
conceptual instruments that can go beyond the cut-and-dried definitions of
social movements as groups of actors opposed to the government.9 The notion
of advocacy coalitions, first, coined by Sabatier (1987) to designate public
policy coalitions and to highlight contextual factors that influence the alliances,
is highly useful in that it leads to thinking of the protest fields of alliances as
patterns structured in social–political networks oriented by a defined action for
a given period of time ending with the accomplishment of the collective
objectives. Likewise, the policy network concept (Kenis and Schneider, 1991)
enables us to qualify the relations in the State/civil society cleavage by pointing
out the diversity of the actors involved in the defense of a cause and the
relatively fluid character of the thus-constituted groups.
McCarthy et al. (1991), through the observation of a strong tendency toward
structural uniformity among American SMOs, stress the importance of
channeling mechanisms in determining the emergence, forms, action reper-
toires and the chances of success of collective action. They thus show how legal
dispositions can contribute to defining a field of strategic and tactical
possibilities for movements. This attention to the indirect ways of government
control is an indispensable complement to the numerous works that have
analyzed direct means of control.10 It will be argued here that this dependence
of movements on institutional means should be considered in a dynamic way in
terms of interdependence. Under certain conditions, movements can contribute
to a lasting modification of the rules of the game and consequently the set of
channeling mechanisms defined by the state; in other words, the way it both
facilitates and constrains collective action. The field of territorialized
environmental mobilizations provides a paradigmatic illustration. The
considerable increase of development conflicts in the last 20 years in Europe11
and in the USA12 has clearly contributed to a thorough redefinition of the ways
in which the representatives of the State as well as planners undertake the
major development projects.
In the case of France, many public policy analyses have convincingly shown
how, influenced by the growing power of the mobilizations around highway
constructions, TGV routes, airports and EHV lines, the paradigm defining the
implementation of public policies has been transformed (Jobert, 1992, 1998;
Muller, 1992, Fourniau, 1996; Ollivro, 1997; Leborgne, 1999; Blatrix, 2000).
The authors agree on the distinction among the three main models of public
action in infrastructure construction: the system of commands, the system of
planning and the system of participation.
In the first period (1945–1970), public action featured the centrality of
the State marked by the monopoly of professional expertise and an
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implementation of policies decided in a sovereign manner in conjunction with
the planners at the highest level (EDF, SNCF, ADP, etc.). This system of
commands is based on a social consensus around the necessity for
modernization and technical progress. The policy of highway construction is
the paradigmatic illustration. In this framework, technical expertise does not
concern itself with dialogue with local officials or consultation with the people
concerned. The State alone, through its main engineering institutions, is in a
position to define the general interest.
In the 1970s, faced with new middle classes and new social movements (in
particular the anti-nuclear), quality-of-life issues and environmental problems
brought about by new infrastructures were beginning to be taken into account
by decision-makers. The emergence of projects such as the high-speed train
(TGV), and in particular the construction of the south-east TGV (between
1969 and 1977), provide a paradigmatic example through the broadening of
public inquiries prior to starting the projects. This new regime of action took
into account the fact that divergent points of view could coexist, which meant
that the monopoly of expertise and the definition of the general interest were
challenged. Moreover, the delimitation of the groups legitimately concerned by
development projects grew from the owners threatened by expropriation to a
set of actors including suitable environmental associations and local officials.
The associations thus rose to the status of authorized actors of public
development and environment policies (Lascoumes, 1994). This is the context
in which the law on the protection of nature (1976) called for impact studies for
any new infrastructure project and that the law on the democratization of
public inquiries widened the functions of prior consultation. Nevertheless,
technical–economic legitimacy, which places the definition of the general
interest with the developers, still prevails.
As of the 1980s, land-use planning finally ‘really became political’ (Jobert,
1998) with the empowerment of protest movements, and local officials, soon to
be invested with new powers but also new responsibilities by the decentraliza-
tion laws. There was also a new possibility for opponents to lodge protests with
European institutions (Fillieule and Ferrier, 2000). In the late 1980s to counter
accusations of a democratic deficit and the development of protests, a series of
legislative and reglementary dispositions were taken in an attempt to respond
to this new situation. Two important steps should be mentioned: the Bianco
paper of 15 December 1992, the result of a mission on transport infrastructure
based on a questioning of the general interest and the issue of citizen
participation in decisions in the highly problematic context of the impasse
regarding the Mediterranean TGV (Ollivro, 1997; Blatrix, 2000). The
procedure set up a public debate prior to studies of a planned route on both
the feasibility and the social–economic stakes of major transportation projects.
In addition, a continuous public consultation process was set up. The paper
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spoke of dialogue as a modern form of consultation. Then, on 2 February
1995, the Barnier law was passed, ‘concerning the reinforcement of
environmental protection.’ Its aim was to correlate all the previous measures.
It brought the public into development decisions at an earlier stage by creating
a National Commission of Public Debate (CNDP). The commission was not
set up to reach a consensus but to provide a forum: ‘It encouraged the
expression of all the arguments so as to examine them all and thus provide
decision-makers with a precise picture not of public opinion (because the
arguments would still have to be weighed), but of the ‘argument landscape’
itself.’13 The first debate was organized on the Port 2000 project in Le Havre
and the second on the Boutre Carros EHV line on the Coˆte d’Azur in France
(Leborgne, 1999). As for EHV lines, it is important to mention the signature of
an unprecedented agreement between the State and EDF for ‘the installation of
electric lines in the environment’ (1992). Updated in 1997 in Lascoumes and
Valluy (1996), this new, voluntary, agreement sets two important principles: the
indemnization of local bodies by funding underground medium tension lines for
EHV structures and also by credits to finance local activities; the indemnization of
inhabitants of new electrical structures for ‘visual harm.’ The right to indemnities
was extended from property owners only to a less limited set of individuals who
could claim harm. This shows how far the system of compensation leads (Jobert,
1998), in that it contributes to redefining the connection between individual
interests and the general interest. Invoking the general interest is thus no longer
enough to demand the sacrifice of individual interests.
This is in a context of the deep changes in the ways the State manages
development and land-use conflicts and in political occasions in which the
Louron affair developed. It is thus easier to understand the obvious
effectiveness of the rhetoric of participation (see Table 1) and the interest the
successive governments showed, after a first phase of resistance without
concessions, in ‘patching up’ the democratic deficit in the installation decision
by postponing the decision time after time until the final yielding to protesters’
pressures. This is undoubtedly one of the explanations of both the length of the
conflict and its fortunate result for the protesters.
Conclusion
The Louron conflict provides yet another illustration that the field of social
conflicts in France and probably in other countries as well has been shaped by
a series of structural transformations that help to redefine the rules of the game
by the appearance of new constraints as well as previously inexistent
opportunities. (see also Blatrix, 2000; Hayes, 2000).
As McCarthy et al. (1991) suggest, legal provisions regulating the activity of
social movements explicitly aim to channel them and restrict their repertory of
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action. From this standpoint, it is worth asking what effects the development
of ‘public debate’ and ‘participatory democracy’ have had on the mobilizing
capacity of environmental associations. On the basis of the case explored here,
as well as from what we know of similar cases, we can point out two types of
new constraints.
First, the realm of political possibilities open to movements has shrunk.
Protesters are placed in a situation of having to agree to a dialogue the terms
and boundaries of which are defined in advance. As a primary consequence, it
becomes very difficult to dispute the actual wisdom of the projects, limiting the
scope of the debate to mere details of implementation. As Blatrix rightly points
out, ‘whereas the texts governing public inquiry do not specify the scope of
what can be debated, the Bianco circular suggests that the definition of the
topic of the debate should be both vague and negotiable, but the Barnier law
later delimited it in a much stricter manner. The result is that the object of the
debate is now well specified (y) But the result of these texts is also that for the
first time associations and the public at large are clearly denied the right to
challenge the very principle or appropriateness of the project, this coming
under the authority of elected officials and public authorities alone’ (Blatrix,
2000, 404).
Lastly, the State’s establishment of consultation procedures aims explicitly
to prevent any claim of lack of transparency in expertise and thereby
contributes to maintaining the fiction that in the production and discussion of
expert knowledge each protagonist is equal. But the weapons the protagonists
have, are not generally equal in power. This means, first of all, that the
required resources for action have probably changed, money and legal
and scientific expert capacity more and more often replacing strategies of
numbers or public disturbance. Secondly, given that these resources are
particularly difficult to unite, there is a good chance that a whole array of
social groups, not to mention causes, will gradually be excluded from the
arena of political protest. Indeed, if Ollitrault (1996) is right in under-
scoring the growing importance in environmental associations of the role
exercised by people working in the educational and scientific sectors, we
must immediately add that their propensity to invest in such and such a cause
is first of all linked to the social logics of their geographical setting and, to
take only one example, the phenomenon of neo-ruralism does not affect
all areas in France in the same way. Thus, we could play the game of taking a
map of France and hollowing out the areas that are both ‘without qualities’
and inhabited by communities that are highly unlikely to have available
one day the necessary weapons to fight development. We would see
rather clearly that the resulting ‘negative’ image would cover the current or
planned localization of infrastructures such as nuclear waste burial sites,
incinerators, etc.
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We will conclude by pointing out to what extent the French context is more
specifically marked by a profound transformation in the relations between the
State and social movements. Fights over major development projects are
practically an ideal-typical illustration owing to the growing preponderance of
the interdependencies that come together at the supranational level, with the
European administrative, legal and political authorities and, at the regional
level, with the departmental and local authorities given the considerable
reinforcement of legitimacy of the local elected officials and their interest to
act. Indeed, not only have the decentralization laws for a long time now
organized a transfer of powers from ministries to local officials, the effects of
which can be felt in many areas. Also, as was the case in the past when elected
officials fought to obtain this or that major infrastructure for their area, locally
situated combats are becoming a means of accumulating political capital that
they can hope to convert one day into voter support.
In sum, the central role of the State in social conflicts is being gnawed away
at both ends, and the image of France as a ‘strong state with centralized
decision-making processes,’ to use the typology most often employed in
comparative studies on European social movements (Kitschelt, 1986, Kriesi
et al., 1995) is probably gradually losing its relevance.
Notes
1 We thank the two anonymous reviewers of French politics for their insightful comments. This
article is derived from a larger research project on the Transformation of Environmental
Activism (TEA, EC Contract) that was carried out from 1997 to 2001 and coordinated by
Christopher Rootes, to whom we owe our interest in and knowledge of environmental
mobilization.
2 The request for registering Louron was made in 1982 by the regional architecture and
environment department (DRAE) in exchange for permission to develop a ski resort
(Peyragude).
3 The administrative procedure for an EHV line occurs in two phases: EDF first produces an
impact study and a justification of the route. They must also file a request with the prefect
asking for authorization to carry out topographic operations on private property. Then EDF
asks for a declaration of public utility for the work (DUP) and the regional department of
industry and research (DRIR) consult the regional and departmental administrations, the town
halls and the minister of industry takes the DUP, which opens the way to the signing of building
permit.
4 As a reminder, in August 1991, a high tension pylon of the Pragne`res Biescas line was
dynamited. The perpetrators were never found out. The No Pasaran! group was implicitly
accused by the press (La De´peˆche du Midi, 26 August 1991).
5 See Walsh (1981, 1988), Jasper (1990) and Joppke (1993) on opposition to nuclear plants;
Gamson (1992) on injustice frames, Snow and Benford (1988, 1992), Snow et al. (1986) on frame
analysis and more generally Klandermans (1997) and Jasper (1997).
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6 It is undeniable that land development conflicts most often mobilize, at least at first, the people
directly concerned, that is the inhabitants; but would the far-fetched idea occur to anyone to
delegitimize the civil rights, unemployed, feminist and other movements on the pretext that they
are first mobilizing the people directly concerned by the cause they defend? In fact, as the terms
of the fight are themselves its stakes, good science should always guard itself from taking up
indigenous categories. From this point of view, while the NIMBY category is a subject of study,
it cannot in any case be transformed into a category of sociological analysis. For a critical
appraisal of the NIMBY label, see Lafaye and The´venot (1993, 500–502), Wolinsk (1994),
Lascoumes (1994, 230–235), Gordon and Jasper (1996), Lolive (1997a,b, 1999), Trom (1999)
and Blatrix (2000).
7 ‘How is it possible, in the blink of the eye, against unanimous public opinion, to sacrifice the
landscape to economic speculation, and a risky one at that? The answer is simple. No one dares
defend an aspect of France’s cultural heritage — its landscape — that cannot be valuated in
monetary terms. That it has a touristic potential unique in the world is forgotten. That it is a
secular cultural and social asset, not a word. That it has an irreplaceable usage value, no one
cares. Bureaucrats in the culture, planning, or environment ministries feel no responsibility for
the ‘setting.’ France has an energy exportation policy today. It still does not have a landscape
policy. Tomorrow, probably, in spite of the mountain dwellers’ increasing demonstrations, other
lines will be launched throughout the valleys. For example, between the interconnection posts of
Marsillon in France and Orcoyen in Spain, still bereft of EHV lines. Watch out this time for the
region of Pau. Spain is entering Europe. The Pyre´ne´es are no more.’ (Le Monde, August 20,
1985, 17). See also Le Monde (Michel Godet and Jacques Mistral — teachers at the CNAM and
at Sciences Po), 14 August 1986.
8 Local elected officials are typically distrustful of environmental protection associations. This
goes back to a urban/rural opposition and contradictory representations of natural space,
traditional for the officials and new for the ecologists, rurbans and vacationers, who see nature
and landscape as a playground. This is clearly put forward by the mayor of Mont (40
inhabitants) in the Louron, and mobilized against the line: ‘the ecologists put forward dubious
and biased things. I don’t mind making gestures but I don’t intend to be ridiculousy City
ecologists can be dangerous: rural areas must not be transformed into zoos. Man has always
shaped nature. There’s nothing I hate more than abandoned fields and farmers deserting the
valleys.’
9 See for example Tilly who defines a social movement as ‘a continuous series of interactions
between the holders of power and those who defy them (the latter claiming to speak for a group
devoid of formal representation)’ (Tilly, 1984; Tarrow, 1994, 4).
10 That is, mainly repression. See Marx (1974, 1979); Fillieule (1997), Della Porta and Reiter
(1998).
11 For example, the deep changes in Great Britain in transportation policy analyzed by Dudley and
Richardson (1998) who analyzed the deviation of the official procedure of highway inquiries
that was supposed to frame the interests involved in arenas without rules by protesting groups.
12 Gordon and Jasper write about America that ‘in poor neighborhoods as well as rich, in rural
areas as well as urban, local opponentsy are standing up to developers, large corporations and
federal, state and local governments. They have been remarkably successful, for example
blocking virtually all proposals for new hazardous waste facilities during the 1980s (Mitchell
and Carson, 1986). These groups are changing, among other things, the shape of environmental
politics’ (1996, 160).
13 Porcell, report of the public debate, October 1998, 43, in Leborgne (1999, 159).
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